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When in the 1960s and 1970s the interest in the study of clientelism gained momentum in 
relation with the development of anthropology of Mediterranean societies, Bulgaria was a 
socialist country, and such studies were impossible and unthinkable. However, citizens were 
involved in a wide variety of social practices to address the perennial shortages of goods and 
services and the political and bureaucratic restrictions and obstacles typical of the epoch and the 
political regime. After the end of socialism the world of these ingenious social actors 
experienced dramatic changes, but did not disappear. The narratives of the recent past have 
shown that as before, “аll  of us have problems which we at least attempt  to resolve via friends 
and friends-of- friends, with whom we may even form  temporary alliances” (Boissevain 1974: 
3). 
How has clientelism transformed throughout history? What are its main manifestations in 
different spheres of everyday life in Bulgaria? These are the main research questions I will 
address. This paper uses the term clientelism instead of "patron-client relationship", in view of 
the specifics of the Bulgarian examples. As the analysis will show further on, the role of the 
patron as a more or less stable social position occurs rarely in Bulgarian environment. The 
prevailing type are dyadic relations in which the patron and the client often change their places; 
these relationships are temporary and their duration coincides approximately with the time of 
preparation, establishment and implementation of a transaction. 
Here I adhere to the concept of clientelism, formulated by Christian Giordano, who, by 
the way, uses the terms “patronage relationships and clientele system” as synonyms: “With its 
implicit strategy of personalyzing social relationships, the clentele system becomes the 
backboneof the management of the common good, which is privatized via multiple extensive 
vertical links featuring dyadic and often long-term ties between patrons and clients at crucial 
points” (Giordano 2013: 35). On the other hand, some authors conceptually separate clientelism 
from the sphere of personal favours and acquaintances (Ledeneva 1998: 56-57; Giordano 2013: 
33-34), most often called “blat” in Russia, in Bulgaria – ‘vrazki’ “connections/ties”. This 
distinction seems artificial insofar as "connections", "acquaintances" and "favours" are 
characterized as  appropriation of “material-like common goods as well as symbolic-like state 
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privileges via highly personalized  channels” (Giordano 2013: 34), i.e. as practically identical 
with clientelist relations.  
Based on the Bulgarian examples I review the system of “connections” as one of the 
manifestations of clientelism, as far as in both cases the mechanisms of social interaction are the 
same. The analysis here is based on the theoretical contributions of Jeremy Boissevain (1974) in 
the study of social networks (Boissevain 1974: 24-28); the concept of social network is a suitable 
analytical tool because of its value neutrality. This paper addresses periods of socialism and 
postsocialism in Bulgaria.  
From a theoretical point of view, the clear distinction between clientelism and corruption 
is a challenge. The study of corruption with the methods of socio-cultural anthropology is 
presented in relatively few publications, in contrast to numerous anthropological studies on the 
clientele system. According to a World Bank study, anthropological contributions to the study of 
corruption constitute about 2% of the relevant literature (Torsello 2011: 1-2). This condition 
changed lately with the growing interest of anthropologists to study corruption. 1  
Difficulty or inability to conduct direct observations of social practices qualified as 
criminal is one of the main obstacles anthropologists face along with apprehension of 
essentialism. Even reaching universal understanding of corruption is problematic, not least 
because the Eurocentric use of this term is not generally accepted (Ibid: 3; Pačenkov, Olimpieva 
2007: 7). Admittedly rather the opposite is true: the concepts of legal and illegal are socially 
constructed, and they vary in different societies; in certain cultures the denial of involvement in 
acts of corruption can even be seen as a waiver of family or group solidarity (cf. De Sardan 
1999: 27). 
Recent contributions address clientelism, corruption and related phenomena in terms of 
inclusive concepts such as informal institutions (Helmke, Levitsky 2004: 725-727; Chavdarova 
2013: 179-196) and informality (Giordano 2013: 27- 46). Helmke, Levitsky "define informal 
institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (2004: 727). While considering the 
advantages of the theory on informal institutions in the context of the "institutionalist turn" in 
comparative politics, I give priority to clear analytical distinctions between the concepts 
                                                          
1 An inexhaustive list should not miss Gupta 1995: 375-402; De Sardan 1999: 25-52; Haller, Shore 2005; Sampson 
2005: 103-130; Pachenkov, Olimpieva 2007; Torsello 2011: 1-26; Hardi, Heywood, Torsello 2015. 
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established (see above) in anthropology. The concept of informal institutions carries the risk of 
essentialism, because it implies pervasive ("socially shared" – ibid.) nature of clientelism and 
corruption. As far as my observations lead to different conclusions, I do not think this concept is 
relevant in Bulgarian context. 
Empirically, my observations are based on fifty-three autobiographical narratives and/or 
autobiographical interviews: a result from a fieldwork carried out in the period 2001-2007.2  
Fifty of the interviews were taken in Sofia among representatives of the so called “technical 
intelligentsia” (engineers , architects, designers, etc.).                                                 
The everyday clientele system and nepotism during socialist epoch. During the 
socialism in Bulgaria there existed a firm belief, sometimes explicitly expressed, that “Without 
“connections” one can neither be born nor die”. Among the reasons for the pervasive influence 
of "connections" on daily life in socialist Bulgaria are the institutional weakness of the states, 
characterizing Mediterranean and Balkan societies (Giordano 2013: 29) and the socialist 
“economics of shortage”. Interview with a former bookkeeper in a warehouse for wholesale 
recalls almost forgotten today deficits of most banal goods: 
"... Toilet paper, caps [for jars], plastic products from the GDR: there were nice basins, 
nice tubs, nice buckets. Their plastic was more refined, while the Bulgarian one somewhat more  
coarse. [...] In our warehouse the most scarce thing were the jar caps.  And there were many 
good Russian goods. And they were very scarce. They were called “Russian sets” - household 
utensils, so on one shelf there were haning on the wall ladles, forks, spoons. " 3 
 The list is much longer than that: with "connections" theater tickets were bought, without 
"connections" it was difficult to get into the list of clients of a reputable tailor, a good 
hairdresser, to receive adequate medical care and so on.  
It is known from the literature that reciprocity is a condition without which the clientelist 
relationship would be lost. Families who needed to accommodate their children in kindergarten,  
had to look for a "connection" (usually with a staff member); however, they should be prepared 
to offer a comparable "service" in return, often – delayed in time.  Just like the kindergarten 
enrollment, access to the driving course or especially the acquisition of a hunting license was 
very limited and therefore a serious effort was required to find the right "connection". 
                                                          
2 Three of the interviews were conducted by Peter Petrov, to whom I am grateful.  
3 Interview with Y. V., taken by P. Petrov on 21.10.2001 in Gabrovo. 
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In this daily mass clientelism (see. Benovska-Sabkova 1993; Benovska-Sabkova 2001) 
the social network established in the workplace allows for transactions far beyond the world of 
labour.  A widespread strategy is to use the social networks of colleagues in seeking access to 
scarce goods or services (for example, if the mother-in-law of a colleague is a nurse, or a 
colleague’s cousin works in a department store). Thus the work position of each person becomes 
his/her social capital and the size of this capital depends on the degree of access to resources. In 
Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, the access to resources got primal importance in informal 
exercise of power at the expense of the importance of money. As Ledeneva testifies, here in 
force is the principle "He who guards, he has"  [‘Кто охраняет, тот имеет’](Ledeneva 
1998). 
Striving to deal with shortages requires a willingness to improvise ad hoc, and a good 
knowledge of the basic principles of clientele transactions. One day in the early 1980s I saw a 
queue at one of the neighbourhood stores and also stood in the line once I realized that people 
were waiting to buy men's socks. A customer wished to buy more than the maximum permitted 
two pair and before hearing the answer of the shopkeeper, she declared she worked as a nurse in 
a dental cabinet. The client, well acquainted with the rules of reciprocity, announced in advance 
what favour she offered in return (i.e., dental care). 
In these conditions under socialism the representatives of some professions, such as 
shopkeepers, tailors, hairdressers, etc. enjoyed prestige and privileges disproportionate to the 
level of their education and training.  A feuilleton, published in 1968, gives an idea of this 
situation. The feuilleton recreates the rivalries between women who compete to appeal more to 
the seller in a local shop for fruits and vegetables in order to get a scarce commodity. While 
lining up the comrades Petrova and Ivanova compete to "prove" friendship or non-existent 
kinship with the seller. "Maybe you are interested, who is that person, over whom women had 
been contesting the right? Kolyo, the greengrocer from our neighborhood department store” 
(Popov 1968: 4). 
One of the interviews provides a close parallel with the picture of the feuilleton. The 
female interlocutor, an engineer, talked about the work of her former husband, a butcher in a 
shop in the center of Sofia, next to the Ministry of Agriculture. In the shop there was a back 
door, where there was a second, unofficial line of people with shopping privileges, but they also 
carried, in return, bottles of alcohol according to the rules of reciprocity: 
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"And then my husband worked here on “Makedonia” [square],  at the buttchershop. [...] 
He was the manager of the store. [...] There, behind the door someone constantly [comes], one 
person comes; says: “for the minister”, “for the boss”. The entire [Ministry of] Agriculture was 
at the door. So I've been there when the line on the back of the store was larger than the line in 
the hall. [...] From there, some friends were knocking, suppliers, everyone arrives, he picks the 
best steaks, he comes with the bottle, [my husband says]:”Come now with this person to drink” 
[...]. But he began to get drunk, bad drunkenness and so we divorced.” 
This family had no difficulty in getting especially scarce and strictly controlled goods 
such as washing machines, color televisions or refrigerators: “My husband was a butcher and he 
had connections everywhere. We did not have such problems: [color TV] "Toshiba" [was 
released at the market] – he calls – they deliver it. [...] In this regard, we have not had problems 
due to the fact that my husband was a butcher and he gave good steaks to responsible people.” 4 
 The theme of everyday clientelism under socialism ceases to be banal, if we consider its 
political connotations. The issue of the illegitimate nature of clientelism comes to the fore here. 
It contradicts the official socialist morality (see Basics 1971; Benovska-Sabkova 2001; Ledeneva 
1998: 2), therefore it was called on the emic level "the second way" (Roth 2000: 186), and in the 
language of propaganda sociology - "the little truth" (see Mitev1984; Rajčev 1985: 13-36; 
Rajčev 1991: 95-103).5 The consumption under socialism was highly politicized (Verdery 1996: 
28-29; Ruusmann 2010: 115-135) and hence the need for government strategies to tackle 
shortages.  These strategies had been published in the decrees of the Council of Ministers from 
1979, on "meeting the needs of citizens" since (Otečestven Front daily, 1979).  Measures were 
announced to limit the supply of goods through "connections".  Therefore, still the use of 
"connections" was not without supervision. 
 Attempts to establish control were evidenced both in archival sources (for this see Roth 
2000: 187) and in narratives. The interview with Jordan.V., a former bookkeeper in a warehouse, 
testifies to the attempts to limit shopping "with connections".  
 “There was an official order. It was known by everyone that there was an order, but it 
was broken, you know that every order is penultimate. [...] But the director scolded in meetings 
                                                          
4 Interview with V. Т., 10.02.2003. 
5 The existence of "the little truth" is as well recognized in the official party documents. The few quoted sociological 
publications on the problem appeared after its marking in the official documents of the Twelfth Congress of the 
Communist Party: "The little truth" exists ... it is a reality" - see Zhivkov 1982: 254-255. 
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not to sell form the warehouse, but it was sold from warehouses. And what they called cronysm 
[vrazkarstvo] - that was exactly it. [...] The managers were  directly responsible for their 
products and they had a warehouse at their disposal. And I just did not have the right to go alone 
to [buy from other warehouses] some things. [...] Only they, only they [the managers] could give 
me something to buy, or so that I could "fix" [pay favour] of an acquaintance. [...] I wached out. 
Privileging only the closest people.” 6 
 This story recalls the established at the same time trade practices "with 
connections" in Estonia according to Reet Ruusmann (ibid: 115-135).  The continuation of the 
same interview shows that the attempts to limit shopping "the second way" had partial success. 
Except for exercising control, the interview makes evident the specific ethics and rules of the 
clientele transactions. Those seeking "services" tend to "stretch" the length of clientelist chains 
and gain access to resources even by more distant and mediated "connections". Conversely, those 
who have access and guard these resources, seek to limit the circle of people who can be 
admitted to these resources. The interview clearly shows that the respondent has done favours 
"only to the closest people", i.e., she has narrowing the circle of beneficiaries of the proximity to 
her.   
The areas of manifestation of the clientele system under socialism are analyzed in detail 
in my previous publications (Benovska-Sabkova 1993; Benovska-Sabkova 2001). Here I will 
outline very briefly the main areas: public healthcare, access to the right to buy housing, 
education and job search. Healthcare is one of the priority areas of the clientele system in cross-
cultural perspective, and medical doctors have a privileged position in this system (Gellner 1977: 
4; Ledeneva 1998: 29-31).   
Under socialism, the shortage of living floorspace (mostly in the big cities) made the 
access to a dwelling a key and hard problem, also a matter of strong politicization. The 
administrative control on dwellings (provided by state, municipalities or by enterprises) did not 
follow the logics of the market; it was rather determined by principles, stated to be social 
(regarding these phenomena in the Soviet Union, cf. Eisendstadt & Roniger 1984: 187-189). 
Family A had to prove to be more needy and more deserving than family B, in order to get 
access to a dwelling; money were of no relevance in that respect (Benovska-Sabkova 2001).  
                                                          
6 Interview with Y. V. taken by P. Petrov on 21.10.2001 in Gabrovo. 
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It is evident from Jeremy Boissevain’s study on Sicily that education is one of the priority 
spheres of the clientelism there (Boissevain 1966: 25-26; 27-28). In Bulgaria, university 
enrolment and enrolment in the elite high schools under socialism were the object of patron-
client transactions, due to the great demand and limited supply.   
The interviews provide enough evidences that getting job is most often done by an 
unwritten rule "with connections" or at least thanks to "acquaintances". One interlocutor admits: 
"All the positions that I have held, I have worked thanks to friends who recommended me or 
hired me directly with them." 7 Virtually all interlocutors got a job “with connections” at least 
once in their career. Some of them have changed three or even four jobs and in each occasion 
they have received information and assistance in filling the job by relatives, friends, friends of 
friends, neighbors, classmates. 
The “misrecognition game”, observed by Ledeneva, is as well familiar in Bulgaria – i.e. a 
storytellers’ strategy to not acknowledge personal involvement in clientele transactions and 
attribute them to others (Ledeneva 1998). Taking this to consideration, I came to this data by 
asking questions about "connections" concerning job appointments in an indirect form: "How did 
you hear about this job?" The answer would be less sincere, if the question directly addressed 
the subject of connections. Yet, some of the interlocutors openly declared theuse of connections 
("I was appointed with connections" -  E. P., born 1925). One of the interviews reveals the social 
fabric of the transaction featuring "friends of friends" (in this case - a friend of a relative):  
"In 1980 I graduated, I started working again with connections since I lived in Sofia. 
There were no [work] places [...] my uncle helped me again. He called a friend in [department] 
"Labour and Manpower", he headed "Labour and Manpower" in Sofia. I went to the door, he 
recognized me, there were a hundred people there, but we just look alike with my uncle. [...] He 
asked me where I lived, sent me to [neighborhood] "Krasno Selo" to [department] "Labour and 
Manpower" on [boulevard] "Botev" it was and from there directly they gave me papers for [a 
job at the designers’ bureau] “Agropromproekt”. 8 
According to another interlocuter, during her fifteen years of work in the same large 
design organization, all appointments were done only by "acquaintances" and "connections"; 
even the students who did internships in this design office, they got there by acquaintances 
                                                          
7 Interview with Е.S., 14.02.20014, Sofia. 
8 Interview with V. Т., 10.02.2003. 
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(K.Zh., born 1954). In this sense the Bulgarian examples deviate from the principle declared by 
Granovetter, for "the strength of the weak ties" (Granovetter 1983: 201-233) according to which 
the use of "the weak ties" (acquaintances) in job search is more effective than "the strong ties" 
(friends). The findings of Granovetter have validity in societies with a strong institutional 
environment; the picture is different in societies with public mistrust. 
The mass clientelism under socialism in Bulgaria coexists 
with political nepotism.  Officially unagnowledged, both phenomena are a public secret, though. 
In an earlier publication, I compared the nepotism, practiced by the regime of Todor Živkov 
(1956-1989), with the tribalism in the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African societies (Benovska-
Săbkova 1993: 3). The family clan of Živkov occupied key power posts in the county.  The 
daughter, son-in-law and the son of Todor Živkov, his wife’s brother, as well as the close relative 
Petko Dančev occupied various high party and state posts. It was precisely the complete 
arrogance in the introduction of members of the family or of the kinship group into the power 
apparatus that contributed to the ultimate discrediting of Živkov’s regime at the time. Public 
opinion was particularly sensitive to the farcical proclamation of his son – Vladimir Živkov - as 
professor at the Party’s Academy of Social Sciences. 9 
 Besides "Živkov" clan, associated with the birthplace of the leader - Pravets, I should 
mention other communist clans of rather local significance: that of Pencho Kubadinski 
(Loznica), of Cola Dragoyčeva (Byala Slatina) or the clan of former “antifascist partisans” from 
Southwestern Bulgaria. In these cases we observe the so called localism, in which the birthplaces 
of "leaders" enjoy privileges. Resources began to flow to the former poor little villages; they 
turned into small flourishing towns and at the same time served as “shop windows of socialism” 
(Benovska-Săbkova 1993: 7).  
The communist nepotism is partly explained with the rural background and poor 
education of the communist elite; with the conspiratiдхьв mentality that trusts only "our people"; 
and with the virtually uncontrolled way of exercising power. The communist nepotism, however, 
is in sharp contradiction to the Marxist moral credo, and especially in “The Moral Code of the 
Builder of Communism”, adopted in 1961 by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union)  (cf. Basics 1971).  
                                                          
9 Political nepotism was not in the least (and still is not) a Bulgarian socialist specificity; to mension but a few cases: 
Ceausescu clan in Romania; or North Korea with “the great teacher” Kim Ir Sung and his hairs. 
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Contrary to the expectations, the communist clans did not disappear after the end of 
socialism, but experienced shifts and transformations. Since the governace of the former Tsar 
Simeon Sax Coburg Gotha (2001-2005), the hеirs of the former communist leaders have 
occupied important positions in the Bulgarian political life. Sergey Stanishev, a son of a 
Politburo member of the former Bulgarian Communist Party, headed the party - heiress (the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party) and was a Prime Minister (2005-2009). Perhaps his political "patrons" 
have influence outside Bulgaria because he is currently the President of the Party of European 
Socialists in the European Parliament for a second term. Evgenia Živkova, the granddaughter of 
the communist leader Todor Živkov, was a two-term member of the Bulgarian Parliament, then 
she retired from the political life in favor of a successful business. 
 
Post-socialist transformations of the clientelist system in Bulgaria. What has changed 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall? In some social areas, clientelism is transformed into corruption; 
in other areas and institutions, where corruption existed still under socialism, albeit unrecognized 
(customs, traffic police), it has become endemic evil after the end of the era. In this respect 
Bulgaria is no different from the general picture in the post-socialist countries (Lovell 2005: 66-
67). After the Bulgarian accession to the European Union in 2007, however, corruption is 
measured in the context of the EU; so Bulgaria, along with Romania, is pointed out as an EU 
Member State with the highest levels of corruption. 
Despite the rigorous public speaking in Bulgarian media and in official documents over 
the past twenty-seven years, the reliable study of corruption continues to be a difficult task. 
There are well-known reservations against the methods used by the international organization 
"Transparency International" in the comparative measurement of corruption indexes globally 
(see Torsello 2011: 5). Measuring the perception of corruption affects discourses on this 
phenomenon, but it does not directly explore corrupt practices. 
Due to the complexity of the problem and the brevity of this text, I will focus mainly on 
the following issues: a) the post-socialist transformations of clientelism into corruption; b) the 
internal dynamics of corrupt processes. I adhere to the most prevalent (though very general) 
definition of corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain" (Sampson 2005: 106; for 
almost identical definitions, see Lovell 2005: 67; Torsello 2011: 3). In the Bulgarian post-
socialist society there is a condition that corruption "assumes that the role of public official is 
10 
 
clearly understood by both official and citizen" (Lovell 2005: 72). Despite the historical deposits 
and historically inherited habitus of corruption typical of the region of Southeast Europe as a 
whole (Sampson 2005: 123-124; Giordano 2013: 30-32), today Bulgarians clearly distinguish the 
boundaries and phenomenology of corruption as well as the distinction between public and 
private (Giordano 2013: 31). Moreover, “most of the Bulgarians are intolerant to corruption” 
(Policy Brief 2014: 4). In this sense, the reference to cultural relativism is not necessary in the 
contemporary Bulgarian context. 
How and to what extent was clientelism transformed into corruption during post-
socialism in Bulgaria? In which social spheres is corruption accidental and where does it have 
endemic character? These are the main questions asked in this part of the text. 
With the development of free trade after 1989, the shortages of goods and services 
disappeared in the late 1990s and with that the need for "connections" in this area as well 
vanished.  The acquisition of some particularly sensitive possessions indicating the social status 
such as dwellings and cars is done entirely on a market basis, also because their supply exceeded 
the demand after 2000 (Benovska-Sabkova 2001: 189). 
Citizens can buy without "connections" apartments, high-tech goods, toilet paper, cars, socks; 
younger generations not only do not remember the restrictions of the recent past, but do not 
understand how this was possible. In similar conditions, some authors like Ledeneva (1998) and 
Popkov (2007: 239-248), announced the disappearance of blat in Russia. This conclusion seems 
hasty or at least the Bulgarian examples lead to different conclusions. Indeed, the need for 
"connections" in the field of trade is minimized, but has not disappeared, because people are 
relying on them in the purchase of quality goods at a lower price. Overall, the clientele system 
has retained its importance in everyday life and in political life. 
Further, I will focus on areas that affect every family and every person in Bulgaria: 
healthcare and education.  
In many social spheres clientelism transformed into corruption. Despite the introduction 
of the healthcare insurance system and private healthcare in 1999, the gifts to doctors were 
replaced by considerable sums that patients pay as a result of various forms of racketeering, 
hidden or quite often absolutely official and institutionalized. After the birth of a child in the 
mid-1990s, R. T. presented to the doctor the usual expensive gift. After gratitude was expressed, 
the doctor declared that family owed him, apart from the usual gift, and a certain amount of cash. 
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This is a typical example of the ability of clientelism to be transformed into corruption. 
Altogether, however, payment in cash implies the possibility of terminating the clientelist 
relationship, as far as the participation of money exhausts the dyad interpersonal relationship and 
interrupts the chain of reciprocity: the service is paid, and so continuing the dyad relationship is 
not necessarily or even unnecessary (see Boissevain 1974: 49).  
Soliciting bribes by doctors or illegal additional payments in the hospitals prompts 
periodically scandals in Bulgarian media during 1990-s (see Benovska-Sabkova 2001). In 1999, 
a public scandal surfaced in Bulgaria on the occasion of a large sum, demanded by a physician 
($2000 demanded just for issuing the epicrisis). In this connection, a series of interviews were 
taken by the press and broadcast by the media from outstanding experts from the sphere of public 
health. 
Even after the scandal wore off, an extract from an interview, carried by the Trud daily, 
can be quoted as an illustration of the existence of the problem, where a question concerning 
corruption was addressed to a surgeon, member of an elite crew in an outstanding clinic. 
Question: “When someone of your patients insists on paying you, do you refuse hims?” – 
Answer: “We have sponsorship accounts.” – Question: “But he wants to pay you personally.” – 
Answer: “This is his right. The salary of an assistant-professor at the Medical Academy is 230 
leva” (Trud daily, 13 February, 2000, p. 5).  
Is it all about petty or grand corruption? Is it accidental or endemic? The first question 
seems simple, but reaching the response is complicated, because the amount of illegal bribes, 
requested by physicians, is sometimes not negligible – it may be thousands in euros or in dollars. 
In the 1990s it was mainly about bribes demanded from patients and their families, especially in 
cases of surgical treatment (Benovska-Sabkova 2001: 180). The introduction of mandatory 
healthcare insurance in 1999, and the transformation of the majority of hospitals into commercial 
companies in 2000 (excluding the major clinics of nationwide importance) 10 have brought major 
new resources in the field of healthcare. These are the resources of the healthcare insurance, 
distributed by the only in the country State Health Insurance Fund. Draining these resources is 
done through various mechanisms, such as prescribing unnecessary and sometimes dangerous for 
the patient operations or procedures; through fictitious mass hospitalization of patients; through 
the payment by the patient of procedures that are already paid by the Health Insurance Fund; 
                                                          
10 See, e.g.. http://www.sveta-anna.eu/about_us.html. Accessed: 1.06.2016. 
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through manipulating the prices of medicines in favour of pharmaceutical companies, etc. None 
of the families in my personal social circle has avoided meeting with illegally requested 
additional charge to conduct the surgery or other life-saving treatment. In an informal 
conversation, held in 2012, a professor of medicine shared her shocking personal experience in 
her role as a patient: during her stay in one of the largest and most prestigious hospitals in 
Bulgaria she witnessed a widespread request for bribes from the patients. 
The theme of corruption in healthcare is daily presented in the electronic media, on the 
Internet and in the press. It is clear that during post-socialism in this field in Bulgaria there is a 
wide range of corrupt practices: from petty to grand corruption. The introduction of the market 
principles since 1999 not only did not end the corrupt practices, but has also led to endemic 
corruption. 
The clientelist relations in the field of education have transformed, but the cases of 
corruption, hidden and irregular during socialism, became a common practice in the period of 
post-socialism. Some practices have transformed – taking private lessons in preparation for 
university exams (Benovska-Sabkova 2001) is now rare. This is due to the reduced number of 
students since 2000, owing to the ongoing demographic crisis since the early "transition", as well 
as the emigration and the access Bulgarian youth has to universities in Western Europe and the 
U.S. after entering the EU. Over the past six or seven years the Bulgarian universities still have 
many vacancies and some university programs are closed for lack of students. The tensions in the 
educational system and the taking of private lessons as a "shadow practice" has shifted from 
admittance to university to being accepted in the elite schools after seventh grade. 
A new form of corruption has emerged: taking exams with a bribe. Unlike healthcare, 
these practices are unequally represented in higher and secondary education. One of the most 
popular universities – the University of National and World Economy (UNWE) - has an 
informal, but firm reputation as being the most corrupt. Publicly known is the sleng riddle 
whereby the abbreviation of the name of the University in Bulgarian should be read as 
"Tomorrow Bring the Required Amount." On a visit at the same university in 2003 I witnessed a 
disturbing scene: a professor who was wiping the inscription "200 lev" painted on the office door 
by an anonymous student. I understood that the professor was forced daily to delete this 
inscription, because it appeared on his office door every morning.  
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An interview with a university professor presents a long and complex narrative of the 
efforts of a group of his colleagues in the late 1990s to prevent a coalition of corrupt teachers 
from "selling" exams.  
The anti-corruption initiative succeeded in this case, but the overall corruption in 
education and science is not eradicated. One example is the operation of the National Science 
Fund, especially after the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union (2007) and the 
introduction of European funds. In 2011, after a major corruption scandal in the National Science 
Fund and following the unprecedented street protests of scholars, the then education Minister 
was forced to resign. Problems still persist because the corruption in the National Fund has not 
been terminated, at the same time its former chairman of the Fund, who publicized the scandal in 
the media, is a target of repression. Overall, the European funds are the main object of corrupt 
ambitions. 
The comparison between the corrupt practices in the areas of healthcare and those in 
education proves that the first are endemic, while the latter are rather expressions of accidental 
corruption. As regards the possible reasons, here we should pay attention to internal imbalances 
in these two social systems: the drain of doctors going to Western Europe (especially after 
joining the Eropean Union in 2007)11 and generally, the unequal accumulation of medical 
personnel and hospitals in the capital city at the expense of an acute shortage of medical care in 
small towns and villages in the country. In turn, corruption in education is fueled by the 
demographic problems (insufficient number of students), along with the low salaries in the 
education system. 
However, there are institutions in which corruption is absolutely pervasive and this is so 
in the traffic police. According to the investigative journalist Slavi Angelov, the internal police 
investigation conducted in 2011 showed that out of 60 squads of traffic policemen only one did 
not take bribes and that was the detachment of policemen who checked on their colleagues. 12 
While it is all about "petty" corruption, its pervasiveness is a systemic problem too alarming. 
The comparison with the quantitative sociological measurements leads to other directions 
of analysis, such as about the dynamics in the perceptions of corruption in Bulgaria since the 
                                                          
11 [A/N]507 doctors declared they would leave the country in 2014. – Medical News, 27.02.2015. 
http://medicalnews.bg/2015/02/27/. Accessed: 1.06.2016. 
12 „On target“. Film by Slavi Angelov, 2014, aired on the Bulgarian national television channel. - 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jeU-sGQRriA. Accessed 1.06.2016. 
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early years of measurements (after 1998) until today13. The highest levels of corruption were 
noted in 1999 (Report 1999: 23) and 2014 (Policy Brief 46 2014: 1). The comparison between 
the reports for these two years show the changes that occurred in the perceptions of corruption. 
In 1999 the Bulgarians considered customs officers as the most corrupt (Report 1999: 9; Kostov, 
Bakalov 1999: 53). A survey conducted locally (city of Vraca) demonstrates that the highest 
percentage of those involved in an enquiry in Vraca (85%) think that the most corrupted are the 
customs officials; 60% have pointed out the tax  administration, followed by judges and 
physicians (40% each) and the policemen (30%). Only after them come ministers, mayors, etc. 
(Kostov & Bakalov: 1999: 53).  
In 2014, the levels of corruption rose to the level of 1999, according to an analysis by the 
Center for the Study of Democracy. "In 2014, representatives of the legislature, political class 
and representatives of the executive branch with high authority were considered the most 
corrupt. It should be noted that the corruption reputation of officials, considered the most 
corrupt, has deteriorated further. Only the reputation of customs officers has improved negligibly 
(within the stochastic error). It is important to emphasize, too, that the reputation of most groups, 
considered the most corrupt, has deteriorated to the greatest extent during the period 2002 - 
2014" (Policy Brief 46 2014: 6).  A comparison between the data for 1999 and those for 2014 
shows that the perception of political corruption in 2014 shifted the notion of customs officers as 
being the most corrupt professional group. The image of customs officers as champions of 
corruption in the 1990s is most likely associated with cross-border smuggling accompanying at 
that time the wars during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. It is clear that the forms of 
corruption vary depending on the political and economic context in the country. In this sense, the 
increased perception of corruption in 2014 is due, among the others, to the high degree of 
political instability in Bulgaria amid the crowded street protests against the unpopular Socialist 
government of of then-prime minister Plamen Oresharski. 
The perceived high levels of corruption do not contradict the intolerance of the 
Bulgarians to it; the latter, in turn, does not exclude the willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions (Policy Brief 46 2014: 6). Despite the high degree of intolerance of Bulgarian 
                                                          
13 The local Bulgarian branch of “Transperancy International” is called „Transperancy without borders“ and it 
carried out the first measurements in 1998 – See the website: http://transparency.bg/bg/. Other NGOs in Bulgaria 
also engage in measuring corruption: „ Coalition 2000“ – see http://www.anticorruption.bg/; Centre for the Study of 
Democracy – see http://www.csd.bg/. Accessed: 1.06.2016. 
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society towards corruption, in the years after the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union 
(2007) between 16.5% and 29.3% of the population was involved in corrupt deals. 
A careful reading of the analysis of 2014 shows another thing: how the findings of sociological 
analysis depend on the methods applied. One of the graphs presented in the analysis for 2014 is 
entitled "Corruption pressure and involvement in corrupt deals" (Ibid: 2, Fig. 3). However, the 
graph represents the percentage of the population over 18 years involved in offering bribes, but 
also the percentage of those citizens who presented gift or provided service. The analysis does 
not contain data, whether the latter two forms are corrupt act or not; classification of clientelist 
forms of reciprocity as corruption certainly influences the conclusions by presenting a higher 
level of perception of corruption. This is not meant to downplay the problem of corruption, but to 
show the need for greater precision in the use of concepts. 
High levels of corruption in post-socialist countries is generally explained by the "relative 
lack of power in the system" (Lovell 2005: 72). As for Bulgaria, the weakness of a number of 
state institutions can be explained more by the multiplicity of centers of power, as opposed to a 
strong central government under socialism. There is indirect evidence of the latter: from the 
analysis of the Center for the Study of Democracy it is clear that the number of those convicted 
of power abuse in 1989-2013 was the highest (355 people) in 1989 - the last socialist year. That 
number significantly decreased since 1992, ranging between 50 and 5 people - the last number 
dates back to 2013. These data vividly illustrate the ineffectiveness of the administration of 
justice in post-socialism and support the thesis of the existence of multiple centers of power in 
Bulgaria. 
Instead of conclusion. Typical of the clientele relations is the desire that they be 
disguised as friendship (Boissevain 1966) and this is part of their particular ethos. However, the 
analysis shows that the differences between the "true friendship" and clientelism are 
recognizable and clearly comprehensible to the modern Bulgarians. In some of the interviews, 
this is explicitly stated. The emotional friendship requires to avoid calculating the returns when 
supporting a friend, and reciprocity is not mandatory, unlike the clientelist relationship 
impossible without reciprocity. 
 The above non-exhaustive examples, however, have to show the high potential of 
clientelism to be transformed into corruption during post-socialism, when the institutional 
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weakness of the state reaches threatening levels. That's why it is important to clearly identify the 
"margins" of the clientelist system as well as its destructive potential. 
Nevertheless, the literature demonstrated the semi-legal nature of the clientelist system 
(Giordano 2013: 41) and its subversive character (Creed 1998: 184; Ledeneva 1998), there is a 
tendency for certain scholars to downplay these negative aspects. In fact, besides being a semi-
legal, the clientele system hampers the work of institutions when professional appointments are 
not granted to people most qualified to do a job, but to those who have "connections". This 
system reinforces inequalities in society. The privileges, acquired by some professional groups or 
individuals, act as a rule contrary to the rights of others who are deprived of the resources of the 
common good. Hence, there is an increased feeling of a perceived deficit of justice in Bulgarian 
society under socialism as well as after it. "Everything happens with connections in this country" 
- that is an expression that can be heard spoken by young Bulgarian emigrants as an explanation 
for their unwillingness to live at their homeland. The clientele system reproduces and reinforces 
even more the public mistrust. Related studies can contribute to the awareness and understanding 
of this problem in Bulgarian society. 
During post-socialism the clientelist system ("vrăzki") and corruption in Bulgaria have 
undergone significant transformations. Clientelism almost completely disappeared in some areas, 
such as buying homes, and its application in the field of consumption of goods and services is 
critically reduced. In return, however, in other social and economic spheres the clientele system 
is transformed into corruption, "petty corruption became grand corruption", and corruption 
scandals have become part of the political scene, as much as in other Southeast European 
countries (Sampson 2005: 124). Corruption in Bulgaria is the main warrant of the political game 
itself:  “every subsequent cycle of political counteropposition turns into struggle for the right to 
be corrupted” (Stančev 1997: 62). 
In certain areas corruption is ubiquitous (traffic police), in others such as healthcare - it is 
endemic, in education - accidental. Sociological survey and economic analysis stress most of all 
on the “grand corruption”, obviously in view of the big economic losses, which it inflicts on the 
Bulgarian economy. The difference of the anthropological approach is in the focus laid on the 
spheres of everyday activities, i.e. “petty corruption”. It is worth considering also whether the 
“petty” corruption practiced en masse does not inflict even bigger damage, namely due to its 
mass character. It is precisely corruption in spheres, in which people are clashing on the 
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everyday level, as education, health services, etc., that most negatively  affect social trust, 
personal and social morality, triggering in this way  the next cycles of the “cancer” of corruption. 
 Taking into account constant failings of the state institutions and negative experiences, 
people in the areas of Mediterranean and Southeast Europe resort to corruption “with good 
reason since tobody is foolosh to the point of doing things that serve no purpose or that could be 
damaging” (Giordano 2013: 42).  
Is it possible then to curb corruption in Bulgaria? Small successes are possible, as shown 
by the grasroot initiative of a small group of academics against their corrupt rulers. Such small 
"victories" are still not enough to change the general picture. Here, however, I have shown the 
flexibility of the clientelist system and corruption and their ability to transform as a result of 
changes in the socio-economic environment. It can be assumed that for the same reason a change 
in the direction of managing corruption in Bulgaria is possible. 
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